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SUMMARY
Research on the role of local institutions in confl ict management is still limited. This study highlights various inter-settlement confl icts 
over the issue of unclear resource boundaries in Danau Sentarum National Park, Indonesia. The park is home to two major ethnic groups 
(Dayak Iban and Malay) whose livelihoods are highly dependent on fi sh and forest resources available in the park area. We demonstrate 
how local institutions (adat) are used to address boundary confl icts and consider their effectiveness. The study also discusses challenges 
that adat face in ensuring the effectiveness of confl ict management. We argue that enhancing communication and developing a mechanism 
of exchange among settlements engaged in confl ict will promote better understanding of the problem and thus allows improvement in 
the current approaches in managing confl ict. We propose a co-management arrangement to ensure the sustainability of the park and to 
constructively manage the confl ict in the area.
Keywords: common pool resources, unclear boundaries, confl ict management approaches, Danau Sentarum National Park, 
Malay, Dayak Iban
Approches de gestion des confl its dans les délimitations vagues des terres communes: 
expériences du parc national de Danau Sentarum en Indonésie
Y. YASMI, C.J.P. COLFER, L. YULIANI, Y. INDRIATMOKO et V.HERI
La recherche sur le rôle des institutions locales dans la gestion des confl its est encore limitée.  Cette étude met en lumière les confl its inter-
exploitations sur la question des délimitations vagues des ressources dans le parc national de Danau Sentarum en Indonésie.  Deux groupes 
ethniques majeurs vivent dans ce parc ( Dayak Iban et  Malay) . Leurs moyens de survie dépendent fortement du poisson et des ressources 
forestières disponibles dans la région du parc.  Nous montrons comment les institutions locales ( adat) sont utilisées pour faire face aux 
confl its de délimitations, et nous considérons leur effi cacité.  L’étude examine également les défi s auxquels les adat font face alors qu’ils 
essayent d’assurer l’effi cacité de la gestion des confl its.  Nous démontrons qu’une mise d’accent sur la communication et le développement 
d’un mécanisme d’échange entre les exploitants impliqués dans le confl it vont permettre de promouvoir une meilleure compréhension du 
problème, et faciliter ainsi une amélioration des approches actuelles dans la gestion des confl its.  Nous proposons un arrangement de co-
gestion pour assurer la durabilité du parc, et gérer le confl it dans cette région de manière constructive.
Técnicas de gestión de confl ictos limítrofes en tierras comunales: experiencias del Parque 
Nacional de Danau Sentarum, Indonesia
Y. YASMI, C.J.P. COLFER, L. YULIANI, Y. INDRIATMOKO y V. HERI
Las investigaciones sobre el papel de las instituciones locales en la gestión de confl ictos sigue siendo limitadas. Este estudio describe varios 
confl ictos entre asentamientos sobre el tema de lindes pocos claros y recursos en el Parque Nacional de Danau Sentarum en Indonesia. Dos 
grupos étnicos importantes habitan el Parque, los Dayak Iban y los malayos, y ambos grupos dependen en gran medida de los recursos 
forestales y pesqueros disponibles en el Parque. El artículo demuestra como una institución local (el adat) se emplea para tratar los confl ictos 
limítrofes y analiza la efi cacia de esta institución, y examina también los desafíos que debe afrontar el adat para asegurar la efi cacia de la 
gestión de confl ictos. El estudio sugiere que mejoras en la comunicación y el desarrollo de un mecanismo de intercambio entre asentamientos 
en confl icto promoverán una comprensión más profunda del problema y así mejorarán las técnicas actuales de resolución de confl ictos. Se 
propone un modelo de manejo conjunto que pueda asegurar la sostenibilidad del Parque y una gestión constructiva del confl icto en la zona.
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Confl ict is an emotive term that provokes various images or 
associations amongst people. As with all concepts in social 
sciences a bewildering variety of defi nitions co-exist (Wall 
and Callister 1995). Daniels and Walker (2001) suggest 
that all social confl icts are based on differences in things 
such as interest, perception, power and goals. Furthermore, 
Glasl (1999) argues that confl ict only occurs if an actor 
feels ‘impairment’ from the behaviour of another actor. The 
experience of an actor’s behaviour as impairment becomes a 
prerequisite for confl ict, thereby providing a clear criterion 
to distinguish confl ict from non-confl ict situations. In the 
context of common pool resource (CPR) management, 
impairment can be experienced, for example, in terms of 
restriction over access to certain forest or fi sh products, 
exclusion from resource management, pollution due to 
resource extraction, etc. (Ostrom 1990, Yasmi 2002, 2003, 
Peluso 1994, Adams et al. 2003).
There are a lot of factors that trigger ‘impairing’ 
behaviour such as unclear resource boundaries, scarcity, 
population growth and legal pluralism. For example, 
confl icts over access to agricultural land and other 
productive uses at forest frontiers are mainly attributed to 
the absence of clear boundaries (Hotte 2001, Dennis et al. 
2001). If boundaries are in place they are often contested 
or interpreted differently. Access to resources is aggravated 
by scarcity and demographic pressures (Homer-Dixon 
1999). In addition, CPR management is often defi ned by 
different sets of rules (formal and informal). With all these 
phenomena confl ict is unavoidable. In Indonesia, confl icts 
over CPR management have been long-standing (Peluso 
1990, 1992). More recently, Lynch and Harwell (2000) have 
provided excellent accounts of the diffi cult history of forest 
management in Indonesia from colonial times.  Numerous 
studies of the decentralization efforts that began formally in 
2001 (Resosudarmo and Dermawan 2002) have examined 
the impacts for people in forests, some of which have been 
increased in confl icts (McCarthy 2006, Moeliono and 
Dermawan 2006, for examples, or Barr et al. 2006, for a 
summary of the fi ndings from a number of recent studies 
of decentralization in Indonesia) - some peaceful, some 
violent.
In many places, the costs and consequences of resource 
confl icts have become unacceptably high (Watch 1997, Ho 
2006, de Jong et al. 2006, Bogale et al. 2006). Therefore, 
the call for effective confl ict management has increased. 
Confl ict management includes all activities that have the 
intention to reduce or solve the confl ict (Deutsch 1973). 
Its ‘ideal’ goal is to attain desirable positive outcomes (i.e. 
win-win solutions) and reduce or eliminate escalation to 
destructive levels (Kriesberg 1998). Scholars argue that 
confl ict management has to mobilize local capacity through 
the use of local approaches such as customary laws, local 
leadership, and negotiation skills (FAO 2000, Engel and 
Korf 2005). Local response to confl ict is seen as the fi rst 
and quickest available confl ict management strategy. It is 
often argued that stakeholders at local level know ‘best’ 
their confl ict situation. External assistance (e.g. a mediator, 
facilitator) is necessary once local approaches can no longer 
function effectively.
What is less known is why in some cases local institutions 
can respond to confl ict effectively and in others not. Research 
on the varieties of confl ict management approaches available 
at local level is still lacking. We need to address the gaps 
between the ‘ideal’ goal of confl ict management and the 
reality on the ground. Against this background, this study 
sheds more light on how local institutions address resource 
confl ict. This knowledge is important for strengthening these 
institutions so that they can manage confl ict adequately. 
We analyze a confl ict case related to unclear boundaries of 
the commons (i.e. forestry and fi shery management). We 
demonstrate how stakeholders perceive impairments and 
explain confl ict management approaches taken by them in 
addressing the confl ict. We also evaluate to what extent these 
approaches have been effective and identify possible ways 
for their improvements. Finally, we discuss general lessons 
and policy implications for the management of common 
pool resources under an unclear boundary regime.
RESEARCH LOCATION, STAKEHOLDERS AND 
RESOURCE USE 
This study was carried out in Danau Sentarum National Park 
(DNSP), West Kalimantan, Indonesia. The park was fi rst 
gazetted as a wildlife reserve in 1982, when it was 80 000 
ha in size; it was expanded to 132 000 ha in 1994; it became 
a Ramsar Wetland of International Importance in 1994, and 
a National Park in 1999 (Giesen and Aglionby 2000). The 
park is located in the fl oodplain of the upper Kapuas river 
basin, Indonesian Borneo, near the border with Malaysia 
(Figure 1). It consists of a series of interconnected lakes (= 
danau), interspersed with swamp forest, peat swamp forest, 
and dry lowland forest on isolated hills in the northern and 
eastern part of the park area (Dennis et al. 2000, Anshari 
et al. 2001). Ninety-fi ve percent of the area is inundated 
during the fl ood season creating a network of rivers and 
lakes. During the dry season (May - September) there is an 
average 12 m drop in water level (Adger and Luttrell 2000). 
The park is home to 500 tree species, 250 fi sh species, 250 
bird species, 3 crocodile species, orangutans, and proboscis 
monkeys (Meijaard et al. 2000).
Technically under the management of Indonesia’s 
Directorate General of Nature Protection and Conservation 
(DGNPC), for much of the time since its gazettement, it has 
been under de facto management by local people, despite 
efforts by a British-Indonesian project (originally funded 
by ODA, now DFID)  in the early 1990s, and continuing 
efforts ever since by the small NGO, Riak Bumi, with recent 
help from the Center for International Forestry Research 
(CIFOR), to protect the area and its people. The role of 
DGNPC in managing and overseeing the park has always 
been limited. Since its establishment, there have been no 
more than three rangers in the park. Due to the small number 
of staff on the ground and the lack of funding, the DGNPC’s 
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role in resolving social confl icts has also been minor. 
In 2006, several efforts were made to strengthen formal 
management, in the face of serious threats to the ecosystem1, 
including the conduct of several multi-stakeholder fora, the 
establishment of a formal management unit by the DGNPC, 
and participatory action research with various stakeholders 
groups in the area.
Indigenous natural resource management has functioned 
well in the past, perhaps partly because of the isolation of the 
area and consequent autonomy from the formal government. 
Technically local management should have been subject 
to the same weakening processes noted by other authors 
elsewhere in Indonesia (McCarthy 2004, Lynch and Harwell 
2000).  However, isolation allowed the traditional structures 
to continue to function comparatively autonomously, which 
also meant a fair amount of autonomy from community to 
community. According to Harwell (1997), local communities 
in DSNP are very dependent on resources such as fi sh, timber 
and non timber forest products (NTFPs), including rattan, 
honey and medicinal plants, also documented in Colfer et al. 
(2000). Two major ethnic groups are found in DSNP (Dayak 
and Malay), each with distinct livelihood strategies. The 
Dayaks in DSNP are mainly the sub-group of Dayak Iban 
and are referred to hereinafter as the Iban. 
The Iban (Christian) are primarily shifting cultivators 
and hunters. They live in traditional longhouses2 - rather 
like modern condominiums - and occupy the more upland, 
drier areas surrounding the lakes (Wadley 1997). Although 
they fi sh routinely for subsistence along the rivers and 
around the lakes, fi shing is not their major livelihood. There 
is considerable variation from community to community 
in terms of livelihood strategies, levels of political and 
collective action, frequency of male circular migration, and 
other socio-cultural activities. Some differences include: 
balance between dry and swamp rice cultivation; levels of 
dependence on fi shing vs. hunting; political and kinship 
alliances with other Dayak groups; leadership capabilities 
and levels of education; religious sect. Yet there remain 
signifi cant commonalities in Iban socio-political, cultural 
and economic traditions (Sutlive 1978, Dove 1985, Wadley 
1997, Wadley and Colfer 2004).
On the other hand, the Malays (Muslims) reside 
downstream around the lakes and along the large rivers. They 
depend almost exclusively on fi shing for their livelihoods 
1
  Giesen and Aglionby (2000) stated that until the 1980s, extraction of products from forests was quite sustainable. This observation was 
reinforced by Dennis et al.. (1998) who used time series remote sensing data (1973, 1990 and 1994) to conclude that local forest management 
appeared to have minimal impact on forest cover. However, in late 1999, Wadley et al.. (2000) found a number of signs of illegal logging 
activity in the area. This fi nding was further confi rmed by Anshari et al.. (2005) suggesting unsustainable logging practice in the park.
2
  The size of longhouses differs from one settlement to another. A small longhouse might consist of nine to fi fteen households, while a big one 
can accommodate up to seventy households.
TABLE 1  Location of Danau Sentarum National Park
(Dudley 2000). The Malay movement into the lakes areas 
began in earnest in the mid-1960s, with many coming from 
the larger towns along the Kapuas River south of the park, 
and maintaining close ties with those communities. Many 
people from these large towns enter the park during the dry 
season when fi shing is much more effi cient. Some differences 
among communities include: links with particular towns on 
the Kapuas; accessibility during the dry season; residence 
on particular micro-watersheds or lakes, some of which 
developed shared natural resource management regulations; 
and involvement in agriculture. There is very little in the 
way of formal ethnography about the DSNP Malays prior to 
the conservation project of the early 1990s. Writings from 
this era include Wadley and Colfer (2004), Colfer et al. 
(1996, 1997, 2000) - most of which compare the two ethnic 
groups.
These two ethnic groups have a long tradition of 
antagonistic relationships, though there has not been violence 
in recent decades. In the early and mid-1900s, however, there 
were headhunting raids by Iban against Malays. The Dutch 
geographically divided the respective habitats, according to 
specifi c tree species that grew in fl ooded vs. dryland areas, 
and assigned each ethnic group its own area. In the early 
1990s, the Malays remained quite fearful of the Iban, and 
the Iban were also wary of newcomers, despite the peaceful 
co-existence of that and the subsequent decade. In total, there 
are 39 permanent and 10 seasonal settlements within the 
park area recorded in the late 1990s (Giesen and Aglionby 
2000). Out of these, there were only 12 Iban settlements. 
Erman and Heri (2005) reported that the population of DSNP 
was about 8 000 and 80% were Malay fi sherfolk. With the 
growing population and increased pressure on aquatic and 
forest resources, confl ict among community groups has 
become more frequent.
METHODS
We collected data about stakeholders’ perceptions on the 
following three broad themes: the major impairments 
involved in each confl ict, approaches used to address the 
various inter-settlement confl icts, and the effectiveness of 
confl ict management approaches. Fieldwork and secondary 
data collection took place between August and December 
2005. Our primary method for obtaining stakeholders’ 
perspectives was through interviews (Bernard, 2002, 
Holstein and Gubrium 2003). We conducted in depth face-to-
face interviews with 31 key informants that lasted between 
45 minutes and two hours. The informants were selected 
through stratifi ed random sampling, of key stakeholder 
groups in the park. The key informants consisted of Iban, 
Malays, researchers, park rangers, NGOs, and district forest 
service personnel. The total number of informants represents 
the saturation point of the data; the point where interviewing 
more informants was not giving additional substantive 
information (Guest et al. 2004).
One important shortcoming of our method was that the 
fi eld team was composed of male researchers. They had 
diffi culty establishing suffi cient rapport with local women, 
who consistently referred the team’s queries to local men 
- not an uncommon reaction when Indonesian women are 
asked to deal with comparative strangers. Future efforts to 
obtain women’s views will require either the incorporation of 
female team members or longer periods of fi eldwork in order 
to establish such rapport. Unfortunately therefore, our results 
do not adequately address women’s perspectives3. Besides 
interviews, we carried out two focus group discussions 
(FGD), one with Iban and another with Malays. During these 
FGD sessions, the three main themes mentioned earlier were 
discussed. We also convened a multi-stakeholder workshop 
attended by representatives of all stakeholder groups. 
We double-checked our fi ndings with experts with long 
experience of working in the area. With the triangulation of 
methods, the rigor (objectivity, reliability and validity) of 
the case study can be enhanced (Kyburz-Graber 2004). Data 
were analyzed qualitatively.
RESULTS
Forestry confl icts
Forestry confl icts can be best understood by looking at the 
historical division and use of forest resources in DSNP. The 
division is primarily based on the location of the settlement. 
Every settlement has its own utilization zone, locally known 
as wilayah kerja. The zone of a particular settlement is 
distinguished from its neighbour usually by natural features, 
such as rivers or hills.4 The use of resources such as timber 
and NTFPs is regulated by customary law (hukum adat), 
which stipulates, for instance, which trees can be harvested, 
which locations are prohibited for harvesting, how much can 
be harvested, and for what purposes the trees can be used. 
In Malay settlements timber is used for house and canoe 
construction, walkways, simple furniture, and fl oating fi sh 
cages. In Iban settlements, timber tends to be used somewhat 
less for fi sh cages and walkways; other uses are similar.
Until the 1980s, extraction of products from forests 
was quite sustainable. However, in late 1999, a number of 
signs were found suggesting seriously unsustainable timber 
extraction. After the demise of the Soeharto regime in 1998, 
uncontrolled logging increased.  This logging is often referred 
3
  From other research in the area, we do know that women have opinions on confl icts, and indeed, have confl icts of their own (Seselia 
Ernawati, pers. comm.). However, the topics discussed in this paper, especially those involving inter-community disputes are more likely 
to be dealt with by men, in the public sphere.
4
  Although each settlement has a utilization zone, people from other settlements are normally permitted to collect timber and NTFPs 
provided that they ask permission to the customary leader.
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to as ‘illegal logging’, but in fact, the scale of extraction was 
such that all logging contributed to the unsustainability of 
the practices. A common explanation for this phenomenon 
has been the political instability in the country following the 
end of Soeharto’s authoritarian regime. During the period 
of weak state control, the so called ‘transition period’ 
(1998-2004), many communities, stimulated by wealthy 
entrepreneurs, took advantage of the situation to make some 
quick cash, often from cross-border sales. The period was 
the peak of unsustainable logging and preliminary analysis 
of time-series satellite imagery corroborates these fi ndings 
(Dennis pers. com.).
Illegal logging in DSNP seemed to follow a common 
pattern. Normally, a settlement made an agreement with 
a timber company to log within its use zone. In almost all 
cases Malaysian timber companies were the major player 
in the activities. Those companies used local entrepreneurs 
as ‘brokers’ to persuade communities to enter into logging 
deals. Once agreement was reached, the company mobilized 
all the necessary equipment and personnel to conduct 
logging. In return, local communities received fees from 
those companies (amounts varying from $2 to $5 per cubic 
meter) and local infrastructure development assistance (e.g. 
renovation of long houses in Iban’s settlements or mosques 
in the Malays’). During the expansion of illegal logging, 
confl icts increased. Most of the confl icts revolve around 
unclear boundaries of utilization zones between settlements. 
Many settlements felt impaired by logging activity done by 
neighbouring settlements within their use zone.
The main reason why they felt the impairment was 
because boundaries between settlements were never clearly 
demarcated. As said earlier, boundaries for the most part were 
defi ned by natural signs such as a hill, river, big trees, etc. Very 
often the same hill was claimed by two or more settlements 
resulting in heated disputes over the exact division of forest 
area. The problem became even more complicated because 
sometimes two neighbouring settlements had not identifi ed 
their boundaries at all. For instance, in some circumstances 
two neighbouring settlements originated from a single family 
root but due to the increasing number of households and 
demand for more working area some of them moved to form 
a new settlement next to the original. In this case boundaries 
between the two were not very obvious. Not to mention that 
logging activities were done without previously mapping the 
area. As a result, it was often the case where one settlement 
felt impaired by logging and blamed its neighbour for cutting 
trees inside its territory and vice versa. This kind of confl ict 
occurred frequently involving various Malays and Iban’s 
settlements. One of the respondents explained:
“In the past these two settlements never fought each other. 
We actually originated from one family. Now, because 
the possibility to cut trees from the forests is open, they 
started to talk about boundaries. One settlement wants 
to claim a bigger forest area than the other because they 
want to get more money from selling these trees. In the 
past they never thought seriously about the boundaries 
because it was diffi cult to cut the forests given the fact 
that people were afraid for being caught by the military. 
Now every settlement can sell their trees to Malaysia. 
Jealousy from our neighbours develops as we get more 
fees compared to them and our mosque is being renovated 
by the timber investor from Malaysia.”
Table 1 illustrates examples of inter-settlements confl ict in 
DSNP. In fact, there were many other similar types of confl ict 
that occurred in DSNP with the same modus operandi.
Fishery confl icts
As with forests, a fi shing zone is divided according to 
different river and lake systems. The divisions between the 
Confl icting settlement Ethnic group Main issue and impairment
Tempurau vs. Semalah Both are Malay 
settlements
According to history, Tempurau and Semalah used to be one settlement. Later on, 
Tempurau was founded as a new settlement next to Semalah. Because Tempurau 
had little/no working area, Semalah people generously awarded them some of 
their area. In this confl ict, people from Tempurau cut trees from the forest of 
Semalah, beyond their own working area. As a result people of Semalah felt 
impaired. They worried that the logging could make their forest entirely gone.
Sungai Pelaik vs. 
Meliau
Both are Dayak Iban 
settlements
People of Sungai Pelaik agreed with an investor from Malaysia to cut trees 
within their forest. In return, the investor paid certain fees and helped renovate 
their longhouse. In the operation the investor hired people from Sambas (another 
district in West Kalimantan whose people are well known as the best loggers 
in the area) to fell trees within Sungai Pelaik’s forest. A confl ict started when 
Meliau felt impaired by logging activity that it considered to take place in its 
forest. The people of Meliau confi scated several chainsaws from those loggers 
accusing them to have entered Meliau’s forest. For that incident, people of 
Meliau asked Sungai Pelaik to pay for all the trees felled in their area and also 
reimbursement for the chainsaws. However, Sungai Pelaik refused and confl ict 
escalated.
TABLE 1  Examples of inter-settlement forestry confl icts in DSNP
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Malay and Iban zones are perhaps more obvious than the 
divisions among the Malay settlements. The Iban fi shing 
zones normally exist in the upper part of the area (upstream), 
which includes rivers and some lakes. The Malays, who live 
mostly downstream along major rivers and lakes, divide 
fi shing zones among themselves. Sometimes two settlements 
share the same river or lake, in which case the boundaries 
may be rather vague. Fishing practices in DSNP include 
the use of a variety of lift nets, funnel nets, cast nets, gill 
nets, traps, hooks-and-lines, etc. The intensity of fi shing 
activities is highly infl uenced by the water level. It reaches 
its peak during the dry season. Each settlement has its own 
customary regulation (adat) that controls fi shing activities, 
such as regulation on gears (allowed and prohibited ones), 
locations for fi shing, and sanctions and fi nes. The head of 
the fi shers (ketua nelayan) in each settlement ensures that 
proper practices are adhered to in the fi shing area. Confl ict 
often emerges when someone breaches the adat, for instance, 
by using prohibited gear or by entering another’s fi shing 
zone without prior permission.
As a result of the vagueness of the boundaries confl icts 
between settlements have been widely reported (see Table 
2). A particular settlement worried about the fi sh stock 
because the neighbouring settlements went fi shing in its 
fi shing zone. The worry was also very reasonable because 
these days yields are declining.  People often complained 
about the small amount of fi sh they could catch these days. 
They said, in the past they only needed to go fi shing for two 
or three hours and they could go home with a canoe full 
of fi sh. During the past few years they have been fi shing 
for the whole day but still they do not get much. Perhaps 
due to the decreasing fi sh stock as claimed by many fi shers 
and the increasing number of households in the area the 
issue of boundaries of fi shing areas has become more and 
more relevant. Thus when people from other settlements 
entered into their fi shing zone, they felt impaired. A confl ict 
became more serious if those who violated the boundaries 
used fi shing gears forbidden by a particular settlement. For 
instance, a respondent said:
“In Danau Sentarum National Park there are a lot of 
fi shing settlements. A major issue is that adat (customary) 
regulations in one settlement very often contradict those 
in other settlements. For instance, settlement A allows 
pukat (gillnet) while its neighbours forbid it. Due to 
differences in their fi shing regulations confl ict often 
occur”’.
Confl ict over fi shing areas and the use of different fi shing 
gear were very common in DSNP and up until now continue 
to be a ‘hot’ issue. Another type of fi shery confl ict often heard 
in the area was confl ict between the Iban and the Malays. 
For the Iban, although they seldom fi sh commercially, some 
of them use poison for catching fi sh and fresh water turtles. 
Poison used upstream can kill fi sh downstream and in 
particular the Malays complain that it also kills their caged 
fi sh. Although the Malays have complained a lot about the 
poison, the Iban still use it on occasion. In recent years, the 
confl ict between the Iban and the Malays was not so often 
reported as during the 1970s. Perhaps, because the Iban only 
use fi sh for subsistence and in many cases they could get it 
from the nearby lakes and rivers, confl ict with the Malays 
was not so intense. It would have been different if the Iban 
also fi shed for commercial purposes. On the other hand, 
fi shery confl ict among the Sayak was rare.
LOCAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT APPROACHES
Confl ict management approach in forestry
The Malay’s confl ict management approach
Most of the forestry confl icts in the park were resolved 
based on customary laws (adat), with adat leaders playing a 
dominant role. These leaders are highly respected and have 
special social status. People often refer to adat leaders as 
their ‘parents’. Showing overt respect to these leaders is 
a generally accepted norm and a must. Adat leaders also 
function as representatives of the community when dealing 
with outsiders, such as government and timber investors. 
Due to the high status of adat leaders confl ict management 
approaches and processes are signifi cantly infl uenced 
by them. Both the Malays and Iban resolve forestry 
Confl icting settlements Ethnic group Main issue and impairment
Meliau vs. Semalah/
Tempurau
Meliau is a Dayak 
Iban settlement and 
Semalah/Tempurau 
are Malays
People from Semalah/Tempurau very often go fi shing in the river that belongs 
to Meliau. Most of those people use jermal (small mesh funnel net) and pukat 
(gillnet) which are forbidden according to Meliau’s customary law. In many 
occasions Meliau confi scated their fi shing gear, their boats and also applied 
sanctions.
Sekulat vs. Pega Both are Malay 
settlements
People from Sekulat entered the fi shing area of Pega without permission and 
used a certain size of jermal (small mesh funnel net) that is forbidden in the area 
of Pega. The confl ict heated up because Sekulat argued that the area where they 
used jermal was their area not Pega’s.
TABLE 2  Examples of inter-settlement fi shery confl icts in DSNP
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confl icts through customary laws relying on these leaders. 
Nevertheless, the approaches and processes between the two 
differ substantially.
In the Malay context, adat leaders are normally the head 
fi shers; each settlement has one adat leader. Those head 
fi shers are elected for a particular term, normally for fi ve 
years. The term is quite fl exible and delays in the election 
often occur. A person can be re-elected several times as 
long he is willing to serve as the adat leader. Generally 
when two Malay settlements engage in forestry confl ict, 
leaders from these two settlements will convene a meeting 
to discuss and fi nd the best solution. The discussion between 
these leaders is normally based on ‘good’ intentions and on 
the assumption that all the Malays are one big family. The 
repercussions of this are that when they engage in a confl ict, 
leaders will seek a way to solve the problem in a ‘nice’ way. 
In this way, as far as possible confrontation and escalation of 
the confl ict will be avoided. However, in some cases forestry 
confl icts did escalate. Figure 2 illustrates a generalized 
model of how forestry confl icts are addressed by the Malays 
based on our observation and interviews in the following 
Malay settlements: Pengembung, Pega, Tekenang, Genting, 
Sekulat, Leboyan, Semangit, Semalah, and Tempurau.
First, customary leaders from the two confl icting 
settlements held a meeting to clarify ‘impairment’ involved 
in the confl ict. In this case it was about forest boundaries. 
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FIGURE 2  Forestry confl ict management approaches among the Malays
One respondent said, 
“The confl ict here is all about boundaries. But you should 
know that the hidden motive behind boundary disputes is 
the race for timber”. If the fi rst meeting does not succeed 
the leaders will convene more meetings where customary 
leaders contest the exact boundaries between the two 
settlements. If compromise cannot be accomplished 
they will go to the next step of negotiation (“extended 
meeting(s) of customary leaders”). 
In the second stage, customary leaders from both 
settlements are accompanied by other prominent people, such 
as previous customary leaders, religious leaders and elders. 
During this meeting elders will be asked to tell the history of 
the boundaries. Sometimes elders will be required to do this 
under the oath. This meeting(s) sometimes can last for weeks 
and months until they can agree on the exact boundaries. 
If they can reach agreement over the boundaries, they will 
then come into a session where sanctions are applied. For 
instance, Pengembung acknowledged that they had cut trees 
in the forest of Genting (another Malay settlement). The 
consequence was that Pengembung had to accept the fi ne as 
determined by the customary laws of Genting. In this case 
the fi ne was 1 million Rupiah per tree cut (approximately $ 
120/tree). The total amount of the fi ne Pengembung had to 
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pay was 20 million Rupiah ($ 2 400). 
Nevertheless, if the second stage of confl ict management 
ends in a deadlock, local governments (sub-district and 
district governments) will be required to help fi nd a solution. 
Normally, the sub-district government will convene a 
meeting involving leaders from both settlements engaged in 
confl ict and try to fi nd a solution. For instance, in the case 
of confl ict between Pega and Sekulat, after a meeting sub-
district government sent a team to help the two settlements 
establish their boundaries. The team together with both 
settlements defi ned coordinates of the boundaries using GPS. 
However, during the survey, Sekulat could not agree with 
the boundaries as they argued that the boundaries should 
be located closer to Pega. This case was then extended 
and reported to the district government because Sekulat 
could not accept the solution provided by the sub-district 
government. At this point, Sekulat proved the boundaries 
by presenting an old document that explained the borders 
of its territory with other settlements, including Pega. Based 
on this the government imposed the boundaries explained in 
the document. The consequence was that Pega had to pay a 
fi ne to Sekulat for all the trees they had cut from Sekulat’s 
forest.
The Dayak Iban’s confl ict management approach
Iban confl ict management approaches follow different 
procedures. The Iban have at least four steps of confl ict 
management (Figure 3). These steps are based on the Iban’s 
confl ict management tradition. The Iban have a hierarchical 
leadership system which highly infl uences confl ict 
management approaches. A settlement is typically composed 
of a single longhouse. Each longhouse has one customary 
leader called tue rumah. A higher customary leader is called 
patih and he heads several adjacent longhouses. There is no 
exact rule on how many longhouses are under the leadership 
of a patih. In some circumstances the patih might only rule 
two longhouses but in others a patih might rule four to six 
longhouses or more. Above the patih there is another leader 
called temenggung. He is the leader of several patihs. Again, 
there is no clear guideline of how many patihs are under the 
rule of a temenggung.
In forestry confl ict management, this hierarchical structure 
is used as a basis for channelling confl ict management 
procedures. Thus, if two settlements come into confl ict the 
fi rst step is for the tue rumah from the two settlements to 
hold a meeting. For instance, in the confl ict between Sungai 
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FIGURE 3  Forestry confl ict management approaches among the Dayak Iban
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Pelaik and Meliau, the tue rumah from both settlements 
played a major role in solving the problem. Several meetings 
between them were held. These meetings failed to reach a 
solution to the confl ict because each side continued to 
dispute the boundaries, wanting a bigger forest area. At that 
time, Sungai Pelaik had already given permission to a timber 
company from Malaysia to log its forest. Meliau posed a 
strong protest because the company was said to also cut 
in Meliau’s customary forest. Sungai Pelaik, on the other 
hand, contended that the part of the forest claimed by Meliau 
belonged to Sungai Pelaik. As the dispute developed, people 
from Meliau confi scated several chainsaws from loggers 
who operated in the forest and asked for a halt in the logging 
operation. Up to this point, tue rumah from both sides came 
into a prolonged discussion and negotiation. Unfortunately, 
the problem was not solved.
Both settlements agreed to bring the case to the higher 
level, i.e., the patih. The patih held several meetings and 
ended up with no solution as both parties stuck to their 
original stands; the boundaries remained in dispute. The 
patih then called in the help of the temenggung, the higher 
customary leader. With his wisdom, the temenggung offered 
a solution to divide the disputed forest equally into two parts. 
However, Meliau refused because according to Meliau’s 
perspective it was not fair to divide the disputed area equally. 
They claimed that they were the founders of the area and 
that Sungai Pelaik came in long after they had settled there. 
They said that the forest area of Sungai Pelaik was originally 
part of Meliau’s customary forest. With generosity their 
ancestors gave part of the forest to Sungai Pelaik. Meliau 
people were very disappointed as they saw Sungai Pelaik 
permitted a logging company to log beyond the original area 
given to them. Up to this point both parties could not reach 
any agreement as offered by the temenggung. According 
to their tradition (adat) if the temenggung cannot settle a 
dispute then they have to decide it through a cockfi ght, the 
ultimate confl ict management procedure.
In the Iban tradition the cockfi ght is the last resort 
for confl ict management. Cock fi ghts also symbolize the 
inability to resolve a confl ict using more ‘acceptable’ ways 
such as dialogue and negotiation. Although they believe in 
the cock fi ght, the majority of Iban consider a cock fi ght to 
be an unfortunate venue for confl ict resolution. Most of them 
would prefer negotiation through their leaders. Because in 
the case of Meliau and Sungai Pelaik, their leaders failed 
to fi nd a solution a cock fi ght was inevitable. They believe 
that truth cannot be denied. And through a cockfi ght the 
truth will be revealed and the ‘liar’ will be uncovered. The 
agreement between Meliau and Sungai Pelaik to solve the 
problem through a cockfi ght became a hot issue as it spread 
quickly to other Iban settlements.  An Iban belief is that no 
matter how strong and big the cock is, if the people have 
lied the cock will be beaten during the fi ght. Nevertheless, 
preparation for the cockfi ght made the two settlements very 
busy. Both of them struggled to fi nd the ‘best fi ghting cock’. 
Once they found their best cocks, they kept the cocks for 
a few days and fed them with the best food. Rituals and 
offerings were conducted to ask for the blessing of their 
ancestors’ spirits. The cocks were presented to the spirits 
and blessings were asked. Prayers were said day and night 
until the day of the cockfi ght. When the day came, all people 
from both settlements plus people from other settlements 
came to witness the fi ght. A particular area approximately 
3 x 4 meters was prepared and fenced for the fi ght. People 
gathered around this area.
The cockfi ght was then executed and won by Sungai 
Pelaik. Some of the respondents told us that the fi ght did not 
last more than ten minutes and Meliau’s cock was quickly 
covered in blood and then died. With this fi ght, it was clear 
that Meliau had to accept the boundaries claimed by Sungai 
Pelaik. It was a fi nal decision and no one could ever refuse. 
As a consequence, the previously confi scated chainsaws 
were returned to Sungai Pelaik and Sungai Pelaik did not 
have to pay the fi ne as previously requested by Meliau. The 
Meliau people were unhappy with the result but had no 
choice but to accept their defeat. We were told that after the 
cock fi ght, the people of Meliau did not want to shake hands 
with the people of Sungai Pelaik anymore. Their leaders did 
not talk to each other. The feeling of being defeated was so 
dreadful.
Confl ict management approach in fi shery
We indicated earlier that fi shery management is dominated 
by the Malays who live downstream along the major rivers 
and lakes. For the Malay fi shing is their major livelihood. 
With this in mind, fi shery confl ict in DSNP refl ects primarily 
confl ict between different Malay settlements. However, to a 
limited extent confl ict between the Iban and the Malay also 
occurs as discussed earlier, for instance between Meliau and 
its Malay neighbours on boundaries and also between the 
Iban and the Malay on using poison to catch fi sh and fresh 
water turtles. In addressing these confl icts, the role of the 
head fi shers was very prominent. Fishery confl ict between 
the Iban and the Malay was normally resolved through 
discussion between the head fi shermen. In many cases the 
discussion between these leaders resulted in a settlement 
although some of these confl icts did re-occur. During our 
observation and interviews, the Iban and the Malay fi shery 
confl icts did not escalate to a high level of intensity as most 
of them could be resolved through direct negotiation. It was 
also explained that using poison has not been so frequent in 
recent years, reducing the likelihood of confl ict escalation.
In the case of Malay inter-settlement confl ict, the 
procedure for confl ict resolution exhibits more or less similar 
processes as those in forestry confl ict management (Figure 
2). The difference lies only in sanctions. For instance, in the 
forestry confl ict normally the sanctions are in the form of 
money but in fi shery confl ict, while the sanction can also 
be in terms of money, some settlements like Leboyan and 
Semangit also sanction by destroying fi shing gear. Leboyan, 
for instance, had confi scated the pukat of Lanjak’s fi shers 
several times and then burnt them. According to Leboyan’s 
customary law, burning fi shing gear is allowed and intended 
to make those violating its territory and customary laws 
afraid to repeat such actions in the future.
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EFFECTIVENESS OF LOCAL CONFLICT 
MANAGEMENT APPROACHES
The perception of stakeholders of the effectiveness of confl ict 
management through adat is quite mixed. Although in some 
confl ict cases agreements could be reached and sanctions 
were imposed, stakeholders perceived that the outcomes of 
confl ict management through adat were not optimal. For 
example, in forestry confl ict between Sungai Pelaik and 
Meliau, respondents from both settlements acknowledged 
that a cockfi ght was able to bring settlement to the confl ict. 
In that sense, it was very effective. The people did not argue 
anymore about the forest boundary. On the other hand, as 
mentioned earlier the Iban saw cock fi ghts as a last resort, 
as far as possible to be avoided. They would have liked to 
see the confl ict solved through discussion and negotiation 
in a more harmonious way. They considered the cock fi ght 
as rather the least acceptable procedure as explained by one 
respondent:
“Although we won the cockfi ght we felt very uneasy and 
sorry. For us a cockfi ght was not the best way to resolve 
our confl ict. After the cockfi ght our relationships with 
Meliau got worse. We don’t visit so often anymore. Our 
leaders do not shake hands when they meet. We are very 
sad to see this happening, it is not easy though”. 
The same expression was also revealed by all respondents 
from Meliau that they did not appreciate a solution through 
cockfi ghting. For them too as far as possible it should be 
avoided.
In the case of fi shery confl ict, some stakeholders believed 
that the resolution of the many inter-settlement confl icts 
could still be improved. They argued that the current 
procedures, although sometimes successful, in many other 
cases were not. Some thought that the sanctions and fi nes 
were not suffi ciently effective in preventing the same confl ict 
from re-emerging. In the case of fi shery confl ict between 
Leboyan and Lanjak, the incidents of breaching areas and 
using forbidden fi shing gears recurred regularly. Thus, many 
felt that sanctions did not work well as the same incidents 
tended to be repeated. In many other fi shery confl icts, similar 
sentiments were also expressed by respondents.
The effectiveness of confl ict management approaches 
was attributed to the following four aspects: agreement was 
achieved and upheld, effective sanctions, no violence, and 
an increased understanding among settlements on the need 
for unambiguous boundaries. For instance, in the forestry 
confl ict between Pengembung and Genting, the high sanction 
(i.e., 1 million Rupiah per tree) seemed to be effective as 
no similar incident took place after the confl ict. In other 
words, the agreement was respected by both parties. In many 
confl ict management approaches and processes using adat, 
stakeholders appreciated the non-violent nature of such 
procedures. They said that adat brings to the forefront the 
notion of a peaceful confl ict management approach. Most 
importantly, many stakeholders said that they had learned a 
lot from the many confl icts that they had gone through.
LESSONS LEARNED AND CONCLUSIONS
Throughout this paper we have tried to establish a picture 
of how unclear resource boundaries and the presence of 
contradicting customary laws can lead to inter-settlement 
confl ict. Unclear boundaries of the forestry and fi shing areas 
have led many settlements to challenge and contest these 
boundaries particularly in light of economic competition 
among these settlements and growing, general confusion 
about Indonesia’s legal and institutional framework. It has 
also been shown that the issue of boundaries became more 
important as competition for the resources such as forests 
and fi sh heightened. Unclear resource boundaries as in 
DSNP pose several important lessons and points to ponder, 
particularly for those dealing with common pool resource 
management. Some indications are already clear with regard 
to why these confl icts emerged and how the local institutions 
(adat) responded. Therefore the following lessons might be 
refl ected upon.
The need to have unambiguous boundaries in CPR 
management cannot be denied (Ostrom 1999). Access to 
natural resources has become more concentrated and some 
groups experienced both social and spatial marginalization, 
which tends to encourage confl ict particularly if rules and 
regulations with regard to resource use and access are not 
clearly defi ned (FAO 2000, Wollenberg et al. 2002, Engel 
and Korf 2005). Claims over the same area often overlap. 
Furthermore, CPR management is often defi ned by different 
sets of rules and regulations. There are a set of formal rules 
defi ned largely by the government on park management that 
cover issues such as resource use in the park, restriction over 
resource extraction, participation of local communities in park 
management, etc. On the other hand, there are also informal 
rules and regulations embedded within local communities, 
in Indonesia often called adat. For instance, in the confl ict 
between settlements described above, each settlement has its 
own adat regulations that often contradict each other (e.g. 
the case of fi shing gear). Furthermore, the contradictions can 
also be with and within government itself. In one earlier case 
the fi sheries department gave out fi shing licenses allowing 
local fi shers to use a gear type that had been prohibited by 
the regional government and the communities themselves. If 
these contradictions make certain groups feel their access to 
a particular resource such as a fi shing area is being contested, 
confl ict will follow.
This case has shown clearly that confl ict among 
settlements in the park have been largely addressed through 
the use of adat. The role of the park management unit was 
minimal, if not totally absent. As we have seen throughout 
this paper, the effectiveness of adat in solving various 
confl icts has been rather mixed. Looking at the cock fi ght 
procedure applied in the Iban tradition, for example, it can 
be said that from the ‘mechanical’ point of view it was very 
effective because the confl ict was stopped through the cock 
fi ght. In short, no more contestation was allowed after such 
a procedure. Nevertheless, if we consider the fundamental 
spirit of confl ict management to bring a compromise and 
win-win solution, such a procedure has problems. The case 
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clearly indicates that hatred and hard feeling remained after 
the cock fi ght. Therefore, a critical implication is perhaps to 
stimulate the effective use of negotiation or mediation (Engel 
and Korf 2005). A daunting challenge is how to strengthen 
the negotiation skills of the Iban and Malays to complement 
adat in settling confl icts. 
In our view, for all those confl icts negotiation capacities 
need to be strengthened. The role of local NGOs may be 
central and increased, for example, through capacity building. 
Another option would be to re-invent the community 
mapping initiatives previously done by ODA/DfID and 
Wetlands International. The initial community mapping has 
not yet been fully shared with all the settlements. In our 
view, there is a need to continue the community mapping 
initiative by making use of what was initiated earlier during 
the conservation project. This initiative will require a lot of 
fi nancial resources as well as expertise. Financial support 
from donor agencies and the Indonesian government are 
required. Another important step to be taken is to maximize 
the role of the park management unit. The unit ideally 
should be able to manage and take control of the whole park 
area and at the same time facilitate stakeholders’ interaction. 
When confl ict emerges the park management unit should be 
able to intervene adequately too. Thus, the issue of under 
staffi ng and insuffi cient budget should be resolved. The park 
management unit needs to have the ability to communicate 
well with all stakeholders in DSNP. It should have the 
capacity to recognize confl ict issues before the confl ict 
escalates. Here again, the role of donors and research 
institutions may be essential to support capacity building of 
the park management unit in DSNP.
In general, for the effectiveness of CPR management, 
it is assumed that communication among stakeholders is 
necessary. Our observation during the fi eldwork indicates 
that communication among stakeholders regarding rules 
and regulations did not take place regularly. The lack of 
communication can, in this context, be exacerbated by 
ethnic, linguistic, gender, geographic or wealth differences. 
Confusion of fi shing rules resulted in prolonged inter-
settlement confl ict. We also learned from this case that 
communication amongst settlements with regard to different 
boundary conceptions and claims did not take place very 
often in the past. They only started to contest the conceptions 
and claims once they had an economic incentive (i.e. selling 
their timber to outsider). Only when they have come in 
confl ict did they realize the importance of boundaries. In 
short, we have learned that managing CPRs becomes more 
complex as use moves from subsistence to commercial. The 
social dimensions of CPRs will have to have a particular 
focus on ensuring the constructive relationships among 
stakeholders involved in their management. Perhaps in the 
future the managers of CPRs might consider a kind of co-
management arrangement where stakeholders plan and 
decide upon collective actions with regard to how CPRs 
are to be managed. The roles and responsibilities of each 
stakeholder are jointly identifi ed and agreed upon based on 
continued negotiation and consultation processes. Adaptation 
to a changing environment is central in co-management. 
Because co-management provides opportunities for broader 
stakeholder participation, the concept gains more prominence 
especially in relation to achieving ‘good forest governance’ 
objectives. Co-management potentially can also provide a 
platform for striving towards more sustainable resource 
use in the park, perhaps reducing illegal logging and over 
fi shing. Nevertheless, co-management should be pursued 
with care because it also carries challenges and risks (e.g. 
increased complexity, low participation, high transaction 
costs, and confl ict).
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